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Abstract
In a well-designed enterprise risk management (ERM) program, the firm inte-
grates risk management into the strategic planning process, addressing strategic,
financial, operational, and hazard risks under a single overarching process. This is
particularly important to large financial firms, such as property and casualty (P&C)
insurers, which face a diverse set of risks. Using a sample of P&C insurers with S&P
ERM quality ratings from 2006 to 2013, we find that the quality of a firm’s ERM
is a significant determinant of P&C insurer performance and that, for firms with
high-quality ERM programs, product line diversification has a significant positive
effect on performance.
Keywords: Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), Diversification, Property and
Casualty, Insurance Company Performance
Introduction
As compared to traditional silo approaches to risk management, a holistic approach
is believed to be more effective for firms with complex and interrelated risks, such as
property and casualty (P&C) insurers (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Ai et al., 2012). In a
well-designed enterprise risk management (ERM) program, the firm integrates risk man-
agement into the strategic planning process, addressing strategic, financial, operational,
and hazard risks under a single overarching process. A portfolio approach to risk manage-
ment theoretically allows a firm to reduce inefficiencies and exploit natural hedges across
the organization, thereby enhancing returns and value. In the last decade, in part due to
regulatory requirements and rating agency criteria, nearly all insurers have adopted ERM-
based approaches for dealing with the wide variety of risks they face (Beasley, Branson,
and Hancock, 2012). However, the extent to which they have done so and the qual-
ity of their ERM programs differ from firm to firm (Grace et al., 2015). The academic
literature has found ERM adoption to have positive effects on firm value and perfor-
mance.1 However, these conclusions have been based on short time series and have used
1For two recent reviews of the empirical literature on the determinants and value impact of ERM in
the insurance industry, see Kraus and Lehner (2012) and Gatzert and Martin (2013).
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ERM-implementation proxies (e.g. announcements and management surveys) that do not
distinguish ERM programs based on quality of implementation. This study adds to this
growing literature by evaluating the effect of ERM quality on P&C insurer performance,
while controlling for firm diversification strategy.
In theory, ERM should be most beneficial for large complex organizations. Therefore,
consideration of the effects of ERM must necessarily take size and complexity into ac-
count. However, previous research has also shown that more diversified firms tend to suffer
value and performance discounts relative to more focused competitors. Although large
diverse organizations arguably benefit from scope economies and greater access to internal
capital, they also may be less efficient due to complexity of coordination across units and
potentially duplicative management and processes (Laeven and Levine, 2007). The most
common explanation for the destruction of value for diversified firms is unwieldy opera-
tional costs (see, for example, Elango, Ma and Pope, 2008). These may include costs of
coordinating across diverse units, incentive degradation (employees act in their own self-
interest, undermining broader firm efforts in value creation, despite incentive systems),
and bureaucratic distortions (Nayyar, 1992). Additionally, it may be difficult and expen-
sive for senior management of highly diversified firms to properly manage an increasingly
dissimilar set of business operations (Jones and Hill, 1988). The empirical evidence in
the insurance literature suggests that the costs of being diversified often outweigh the
benefits, with many studies concluding that product line and/or geographic diversifica-
tion result in reduced performance and/or value relative to more focused peers (Berger,
Cummins, and Weiss, 2000; Elango, Ma and Pope, 2008; Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008;
Berry-Stölzle, Hoyt, and Wende, 2013).
It is our hypothesis that one way in which high-quality ERM programs can add value to
large complex organizations is through the establishment of metrics and decision processes
that result in improved analysis of the benefits and costs associated with the corporate
diversification strategy. There are obvious synergies from using a consistent risk man-
agement framework and process across the organization rather than in silos. Firms may
benefit from improved operational efficiency, establishment of more effective incentive
structures, and more appropriate allocation of capital, all of which are notable challenges
for a diversified organization (Grace et al., 2015; Berry-Stozle and Xu, 2013). Shareholder
value is arguably enhanced by optimizing the risk-return tradeoff in a portfolio context
(Farrell and Gallagher, 2014).
Previous insurance research has identified positive value effects for ERM adoption and
negative value effects for product line and geographic diversification. Our study con-
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tributes to this literature by identifying the combined performance and value effects of
ERM and diversification for large P&C insurers for the period 2006-2013, using a third-
party ERM-quality assessment from Standard & Poor’s (S&P). We find that diversifica-
tion, when combined with high-quality ERM programs, can improve firm performance
and help optimize shareholder outcomes as compared to silo approaches. Lastly, an ad-
ditional contribution of this paper is to provide a detailed summary of the S&P ERM
rating criteria, cross-sectional characteristics of P&C insurer ratings, and the relationship
of ERM ratings to financial strength ratings, which should be valuable information to
researchers, investors, and regulators as ERM permeates corporate practices.
Because we limit our study to P&C firms with S&P ERM-quality ratings, our sam-
ple consists primarily of large multi-line firms (76 firms, of which only 3 were single-line
in 2013). Although we cannot generalize the results to other firms with different char-
acteristics, we believe that our results are economically significant because our sample
represents 60% of the industry based on premiums written (over 75% of publicly-traded
firms) and more than half of the industry by market capitalization. Furthermore, because
larger firms are more likely to implement and benefit from ERM and to consider using
a diversification strategy, the sample is fairly representative of the firms to which our
research questions are most relevant.
The next section reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the per-
formance effects of ERM and diversification, provides additional background on related
trends for P&C insurers, and explains the hypothesized ERM-diversification-performance
relationship. We then identify the empirical models employed for testing this relationship,
describe our sample, and present the empirical results.
Background and Previous Literature
Background and Literature Review on Enterprise Risk Management
A variety of factors have contributed to the widespread adoption of ERM, including
enhanced concerns about systemic risks after the global financial crisis and improvements
in technology related to risk quantification and tracking. ERM is uniquely different from
traditional risk management approaches that have usually been reactive rather than proac-
tive. Placement of risk management at higher levels of managerial responsibility, often
the C-suite level, allows integration of risk decisions into fundamental corporate strate-
gies. Ultimately, the objectives of ERM are to protect and enhance stakeholder value
(Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Farrell and Gallagher, 2014; Ai, Brockett and Wang, 2015).
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Industry and rating agencies report anecdotal evidence that ERM softened the effect of
the economic recession, increasing adopting firms’ identification of and preparation for
complex and interrelated risks (S&P, 2010b).
Insurance industry stakeholders, including legislators, regulators, and rating agencies,
have widely embraced ERM and taken actions to encourage adoption by firms. For exam-
ple, the inclusion of ERM quality ratings in credit rating assessments by rating agencies,
such as S&P and A.M. Best, provides a strong incentive for ERM at rated firms. In addi-
tion, the NAIC’s new regulatory standard Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA)
is expected to provide a major push toward advancing the commitment to ERM as a
value-enhancing strategy for U.S. insurers at all levels (NAIC, 2014). The Dodd-Frank
Act (2010) creation of the Federal Insurance Office, charged with studying systemic risks
posed by insurance products and firms, has put pressure on state legislators to adopt
uniform standards that include mandated centralized risk management (Brown, 2013).
In response to these changes, insurers and other financial firms are being proactive in
adopting and implementing ERM. Based on a survey of 131 large financial institutions,
Deloitte (2011) reports that 79 percent had ERM or equivalent centralized risk manage-
ment programs in place in 2010, up from 59 percent in 2008. Similar rates of adoption
were found in a 2011 survey of executives from other industries (Deloitte, 2012). The
2013 RIMS Enterprise Risk Management Survey found that 21 percent of respondents
had fully integrated ERM across the organization and 42 percent had partially integrated
ERM (RIMS, 2013). Whether the trend in ERM adoption is due to perceived value-
enhancing effects by firm management or is merely a response to regulatory and rating
agency policies is still a matter of debate.
There is an extensive literature on the value of risk management more generally.
Possible benefits include reduced volatility for earnings and stock prices, reduced ex-
ternal capital costs, increased capital efficiency, operating flexibility, and cost reductions
achieved through more efficient capture of synergies in risk management activities (See
e.g. MacMinn, 1987; Meulbroek, 2002; Smithson and Simkins, 2005; Gamba and Triantis,
2013; Berry-Stölzle and Xu, 2013; Eckles, Hoyt, and Miller, 2014). Finance theory sug-
gests that risk management has the potential to add value to diversified shareholders when
it can reduce costs arising from market imperfections. Examples of market imperfections
that can be addressed by risk management include taxes (Modigliani and Miller, 1963),
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and external capital costs (Froot, Scharfstein,
and Stein, 1993).2 The portfolio approach applied in ERM programs may also yield orga-
2For further discussion, see Grace et al. (2015) and Farrell and Gallagher (2014).
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nizational benefits such as increased risk awareness, synergistic cost reductions (Doherty,
2000; Nocco and Stulz, 2006) and improved capital allocation decisions (Myers and Reed,
2001).
The empirical literature on the value of ERM3 has been hampered by lack of reliable
and unbiased data on corporate risk management activities. Earlier ERM studies focus
on the incidence and determinants of adoption and characteristics of firms with ERM
programs (see e.g. Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Kleffner, Lee, and McGannon, 2003; and
Beasley, Clune and Hermanson, 2005). Not surprisingly, these studies find that size and
complexity are major determinants of ERM adoption. Because an essential factor in the
success of ERM implementation is that the program must be championed at a high level of
management, several studies investigate whether the creation of a specialized managerial
position, such as a Chief Risk Officer (CRO), is related to ERM adoption (Liebenberg
and Hoyt, 2003; Beasley, Pagach and Warr, 2008; Pagach and Warr, 2011; RIMS, 2013).
Although the appointment of a CRO may be a strong signal of firm commitment to ERM,
Grace et al. (2015) point out that it may be only loosely correlated with implementation
or effectiveness of an ERM program. Linking insurer financial data to a survey of risk
management practices, they find that the existence of a primary reporting relationship
from the risk manager to the C-Suite level of management (CEO or CFO) is an important
factor because, otherwise, the risk manager may not have sufficient authority to implement
necessary changes at an organizational level.
Given the increasing number of firms using ERM, academic interest is shifting from
examining determinants of ERM adoption and CRO appointment to more interesting
and timely questions related to the financial consequences, value effects, and/or efficiency
effects of ERM (e.g. Gordon, Loeb, and Tseng 2009; Grace et al. 2015). The fact
that most studies use announcements of CRO appointments or ERM adoption as proxies
for ERM implementation without being able to distinguish firms based on quality of
ERM (e.g. Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Pagach and Warr, 2011; Berry-Stölzle and Xu,
2013) may explain the inconsistent results that have been reported in this literature. For
example, Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) simultaneously model the determinants of ERM
adoption and the effect on firm value using Tobin’s Q as a proxy, and conclude that ERM
adoption results in a 20 percent value premium. However, Pagach and Warr (2011) do not
find a significant effect. A few studies use survey data on risk management activities as an
ERM proxy (e.g. Kleffner, Lee, and McGannon, 2003; Beasley, Clune, and Hermanson,
3Although we briefly overview the literature in this section, for a more complete discussion and com-
parison of previous studies, see Gatzert and Martin (2013).
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2005; Farrell and Gallagher, 2014; Grace et al. 2015). For example, Grace et al. (2015)
conclude that certain reported risk management characteristics, measured by responses
to Tillinghast Towers Perrin ERM surveys from 2004 and 2006, result in improved cost
and revenue efficiency.4 Their results are consistent with Farrell and Gallagher (2014)
who use self-reported survey data from 2006-2011 and conclude that maturity of an ERM
program and the degree of top-down executive engagement are positively related to firm
value.
A conclusion of much of this prior literature is that ERM adoption and C-level over-
sight are value-enhancing to insurers. However, in the current environment, where nearly
all insurers have taken these actions, estimation of value effects should control for the
quality of the ERM programs. While survey data provides certain details that can be
useful for analysis, they do not provide an independent quality assessment and thus share
some common drawbacks with the self-reported announcement data used in several earlier
ERM studies.
Until recently, it was not possible to analyze this issue due to the lack of unbiased
data on ERM quality. However, the S&P ERM-quality ratings offer the opportunity for
additional insights into the value of ERM relative to subjective survey responses or self-
reported public announcements related to ERM adoption or CRO appointments. This
independent assessment of ERM-quality should improve performance model specification
relative to previous studies. ERM-quality ratings have been used by rating agencies
for several years in their financial strength assessments for some firms, but very few
empirical studies have incorporated these measures thus far. Pooser (2012) examines
the determinants of receiving an ERM quality rating by the S&P in 2009 and 2010 and
Baxter, et al. (2013) evaluate factors that are associated with higher ratings from 2006 to
2008. Size and complexity are found to be important factors in both studies. McShane,
Nair, and Rustambeokov (2011) find a positive relationship between S&P ERM quality
and Tobin’s Q for rated insurers in 2008. Because S&P initially rated fewer firms, these
studies cover small samples and short time series. Additionally, changes in the regulatory
and risk management environment in recent years imply that insurers’ risk management
practices are likely to have evolved since then.
4Many other studies use frontier efficiency techniques to estimate insurer performance. See Cummins
and Weiss (2014) for a summary. These measures have been shown to be positively related to traditional
measures of firm performance. See e.g. Leverty and Grace (2010).
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Literature on Diversification and Performance
ERM is arguably of more benefit to diversified firms, in part because it may alleviate
some of the negative value effects that have been documented in the literature. To the
extent that product line and geographic diversification are key risk management strategies,
it is interesting that many studies have found diversification to have a negative effect on
performance and value, although the existence and the extent of the discount has been
shown to differ by industry (Santalo and Becerra 2008). Theoretically, the benefits of
insurer diversification are related to economies of scope, larger internal capital markets,
potential for cross-selling of products, reduced costs of production, and more efficient
governance structures. However, if not properly managed, these benefits may be offset
by increased agency costs and less efficient allocation of capital among divisions of the
firm.5 Most studies conclude that the net effect of diversification is negative for insurers.
Evidence of decreasing returns to scale (Cummins and Xie, 2009) and negative value
effects for acquirers (Shim, 2011) suggest that recent consolidation trends in the P&C
industry are explainable based on risk management objectives such as increased liquidity,
improved efficiency, and capital allocation concerns.6
The finding of a diversification discount is relatively robust to various measures of
diversification and value as well as to different empirical methodologies. Insurer diversi-
fication has been measured in different ways in various studies, including: whether firms
sell both P&C and Life and Health (L&H) products versus specializing (Hoyt and Tri-
eschmann, 1991); a dummy variable for single line vs. multi-line insurers (Liebenberg
and Sommer 2008); the complement of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) across
P&C and L&H (Tombs and Hoyt, 1994), across all 45 P&C business lines, or across a
reduced number of P&C business lines (with certain lines consolidated) (Elango, Ma, and
Pope, 2008; Berry-Stölzle et al., 2011); and the complement of the HHI across geographies
(Elango, Ma, and Pope, 2008).
Studies also differ in their choice of performance variables. For other industries, the
effects of diversification have commonly been measured by reference to the impact on
stock price or return. Because so few insurers are publicly traded, some studies have used
return measures based on accounting or statutory values. Despite these issues, however,
the diversification discount has been shown to be robust to the value measure choices,
5For a more complete review of this literature, see Berry-Stölzle et al. (2012) and Elango, Ma, and
Pope (2008).
6For example, Powell and Sommer (2007) report on the prevalence of capital transfers among affiliated
P&C insurers.
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with effects seen on stock returns (Hoyt and Trieschman, 1991), Tobin’s Q and various
accounting measures, such as Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE)
(Elango, Ma, and Pope, 2008; Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008). In a related study, Shim
(2011) specifically looks at the value effects of diversification in mergers and acquisitions
(M&As). He finds that acquirers suffer a diversification discount and experience greater
earnings volatility during and after the M&As, perhaps as the result of increased frictions
and agency problems.
Based on our review of the literature, the value effects of combined ERM and diversi-
fication strategies on P&C insurers are still indeterminate. Diversification is a strategic
decision that should be based on careful evaluation of risks and rewards. Given the
various potential benefits of ERM as previously discussed, firms with high quality ERM
programs might be able to better capture the value-enhancing effects of the diversification
decision, whereas those with ineffective and/or decentralized risk management might not.
As an example, ERM might lead a given firm’s management to a more diversified strat-
egy because its analysis suggests that the firm has a unique ability to manage in diverse
geographies or product lines, leading to competitive advantage and value creation. An-
other firm’s management might come to the conclusion that a more focused approach is
preferable because diversification imposes too many agency costs. Appropriate risk man-
agement strategies are designed and implemented in conjunction with the diversification
strategy to maximize performance and value.7 In addition to differences in methodologies,
sample periods, control variables, and measures of ERM and diversification, the previous
literature has not examined these interacting effects. Furthermore, most ERM and di-
versification studies analyze data from years that precede the financial crisis, widespread
adoption of ERM, and recent declines in P&C product line diversification. In the next
section, we describe these recent trends in more detail as motivation for our empirical
study of the combined effects of ERM and diversification.
7Compare, for example, two highly rated insurers with very different diversification strategies. The
S&P ERM report on USAA compliments the firm on its excellent ERM program and notes that: “Al-
though USAA has a diverse product portfolio including life, personal lines, bank, and asset management,
USAA has limited the risk by not engaging in products that increase its risk profile, and it exploits
its position as a non-public company by having an adequate capital cushion.” (S&P, 2011) S&P also
praises GEICO’s ERM program but notes that the firm’s focus on personal auto is a “strength to the
rating.”(S&P, 2009) These two examples show that Excellent/Strong ERM programs can be associated
with very different diversification decisions, and both ERM and diversification are aspects of optimized
corporate strategies.
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Recent Trends in P&C Diversification and ERM
Two important trends in the P&C insurance industry that provide motivation for our
research are declining product line diversification and widespread adoption of centralized
risk management approaches.
Declining Diversification
Whereas other industries have continued the trend of the last decades toward diversifi-
cation to achieve economies of scale and scope, P&C insurers are becoming more focused
by product line in recent years (Shim, 2011). We define geographic and business line
diversification using the standard approach in the insurance literature. Business line di-
versification (BLDIVkt) and geographic diversification (GEODIVkt) for firm k in year t
are measured as the complement of the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration Index. These















where DPWkjt is the direct premiums written for the business line j (or geographic area
j). Consistent with Berry-Stölzle et al. (2012), business line diversification considers
premiums written across 24 lines of business,8 and the geographic diversification measure
is based on direct premiums written across 57 geographic areas, as reported in the NAIC
statutory accounting statements. The historical trends in average firm-level business line
and geographic diversification from 2001 to 2013, not including single line firms and firms
which operate in only one state, are illustrated in Figure 1.
During the period depicted in this graph, average BLDIV for multi-line firms declined
from 0.49 to 0.44, but over that same period, average GEODIV was virtually unchanged at
8Previous studies have defined concentration and diversification based on the full 43 lines reported on
Schedule P of the NAIC financial reports (see e.g. Bajtelsmit and Bouzouita, 1998) or based on a smaller
number of lines of business, in which similar lines of business are considered as a single line, collapsing
the total number of lines, as in Berry-Stölzle et al. (2012). Although the choice of how to collapse the
lines is somewhat subjective, the results for our analysis do not differ substantially based on the choice
of diversification measure. In this paper, we report the results based on 24 business lines to facilitate
comparison with more recent research. While not reported here, we also conducted robustness tests using
a multi-line dummy as in Liebenberg and Sommer (2008).
9
approximately 0.62. Paired t-tests for differences in means showed the decline in BLDIV
to be significant at the 1% level.9
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
When broken out by terciles of firm size, as depicted in Figure 2, the larger and more
diversified firms experienced smaller changes in diversification than the less diversified
firms over this period, but all three groups reduced product line diversification. Again,
average GEODIV was virtually unchanged for each of the three firm size categories as
shown in Figure 3.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
Widespread Adoption of Enterprise Risk Management
Coinciding with the decline in diversification among P&C insurers, there has been
increased interest in the adoption of ERM. This is not unique to insurers, but adoption
rates are much higher among these firms than in other industries (Deloitte, 2011; RIMS,
2013). Although the motivations for this trend may be different by firm, regulatory
pressure, technological advances in risk monitoring and measurement, and perceived value
effects are all possible explanations.
To assist outside stakeholders and regulatory authorities in assessing risk management
quality as a component of broader assessments of credit quality and capital adequacy,
rating agencies have begun to assess ERM as well. For example, as one of the eight com-
ponents of its financial strength rating for insurers (S&P 2013b), Standard and Poor’s
rates each insurer’s ERM program as: Excellent, Strong, Adequate, or Weak. This rating,
which was first implemented in 2006, is based on an in-depth analysis of the firm’s risk
culture, processes for addressing current and future risk exposures, quality of risk mod-
eling, and strategic integration. As evident from detailed rating agency documentation,
the ERM quality ratings specifically consider the risk and reward tradeoffs in the firm’s
9To see the economic significance of the decline in diversification, consider the following example. A
firm with 70 percent of its business in one line of business and the remainder evenly split between five
other lines of business has BLDIV equal to 0.5. A firm with only two lines of business, split 70 percent/30
percent has a BLDIV equal to 0.42.
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diversification decisions.10 This provides further motivation for our hypothesis that a
high quality ERM program (as assessed by S&P’s rating), combined with the optimized
diversification strategies, may lead to improved firm performance and/or value.
Beginning in 2009, the Adequate category was split into three sub-levels: Adequate,
Adequate with Strong Risk Controls, and Adequate with Positive Trend (S&P, 2010a).
In 2013, the Excellent category was renamed as Very Strong and the Adequate with
Positive Trend category was eliminated (S&P 2013a). Figure 4 illustrates the most recent
distribution of these ratings for all P&C insurers evaluated by Standard & Poor’s Ratings
Services in 2013. Detailed definitions for each of these rating categories are provided in
Appendix.
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
The number of insurers receiving ERM quality ratings has increased over time and
the rated P&C insurers now represent more than half of the industry by market cap-
italization and nearly two-thirds by direct premiums written and net total assets. An
even larger proportion of publicly-traded insurers (about 75% by premiums written and
total assets) receive ERM quality ratings. The vast majority of firms receive a rating of
Adequate. Comparing 2012 and 2013, a smaller proportion of firms were ranked as Weak
and Excellent in 2013. Interestingly, P&C insurers have a greater percentage of scores
above Adequate than do life insurers. S&P suggests that this is mainly because of life
insurers’ greater exposure to asset and market/interest rate-related risks, the longer time
horizon for their risks, and the difficulties inherent in managing those risks especially in
the post-financial crisis economic environment.11
S&P’s ERM rating is also closely related to its widely-recognized financial strength
rating for insurers. The financial strength rating is S&P’s assessment of the insurer’s
financial soundness and ability to meet ongoing obligations to its policyholders (S&P,
2013b). Maintaining excellent financial strength ratings is important for insurers to attract
and retain customers and to meet scrutiny from regulators and investors. Because insurers’
liabilities are primarily obligations to policyholders rather than interest-bearing debt, the
10For example, in its explanation of 2013 ERM quality ratings, S&P specifies that P&C insurers with
high ERM ratings will have “coordination across different business lines, geographies. . . ” (S&P, 2013a,
p.24), “incentive structure . . . tied to the portfolio-based performance targets that balance risk and
rewards,” (S&P, 2013a, p.27), “frequent and thorough analysis of concentration,” (S&P, 2013a, p.25),
and will “manage risks with an enterprise view, taking into consideration correlation and diversification.”
(S&P, 2013a, p.8).
11Bajtelsmit, Villupurum and Wang (2015) discuss these issues more fully and show empirically that
life insurers are more sensitive to downside risk.
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financial strength rating is considered to be as important as the general credit rating for
these firms.
Table 1 delineates the S&P ERM Quality Ratings for firms in each of the Financial
Strength Rating categories12 and illustrates the positive relation between these two vari-
ables. While only a small percentage of insurers (about 15%) received a financial strength
rating during this sample period, over 80% of those with an ERM rating received a finan-
cial strength rating as well. We can also clearly see a positive relation between these two
ratings. For example, all the AAA-rated firms have an ERM rating of either Strong or
Excellent, and no insurer with a financial strength rating above an A+ has a Weak ERM
rating. Similarly, no insurer below a BBB+ rating has a Strong or Excellent ERM Quality
Rating. However, it is also worth noting that the Financial Strength Rating would not
be an appropriate proxy for ERM quality because there is still significant heterogeneity
of the ERM ratings for firms with the same Financial Strength Rating, and vice versa.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
The ERM-Diversification-Performance Relationship
As discussed in the earlier sections, ERM may add value to a P&C insurer by helping
it better trade off the costs and benefits of geographic and product line diversification.
Although diversification can offer synergies and scope economies, managing a more di-
verse enterprise may be more costly due to agency and coordination costs. Firms with
well-functioning ERM programs may be better at managing these costs, resulting in im-
proved performance relative to other similar firms in their industry. Given that previous
studies have generally found more diversified firms to suffer a value discount, the purpose
of this research is to evaluate the effects of ERM on financial performance in light of
observed diversification strategies, while controlling for the effect of firm characteristics.
We therefore run models of the general theoretical form:
Performance = f(ERM quality, diversification,
ERM quality × diversification | firm characteristics) (3)
Performance is alternatively measured as Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q to
capture both the accounting-based performance and the market value assessment. ROA
is measured as Net Income/Book Value of Assets and Tobin’s Q is the (Market Value of
12Consistent with empirical studies in the credit rating and other finance literature, a larger numeric
value of the financial strength rating variable indicates a lower quality of rating.
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Equity + Book Value of Liabilities)/Book Value of Assets. The Tobin’s Q specification is
only used for publicly-traded firms that derive most of their revenue from P&C insurance
premiums and where market data is available. Although some studies have alternatively
used Return on Equity (ROE) as a measure of performance, it is more difficult to compare
across publicly-traded and private firms and thus we do not use it in this study.13
Based on the prior literature, we expect that, in addition to ERM-quality and diversifi-
cation, firm financial performance will depend on size, capital structure, group affiliation,
ownership characteristics, and risk.14 We discuss the construction of these variables and
their expected relationship with the performance/value variable in more detail in the next
section.
Sample and Data Description
The sample consists of all U.S. P&C insurance companies for which S&P ERM quality
ratings are available, for the period from 2006 to 2013. The analysis is at the group
level, with the unit of observation being the group or unaffiliated firm.15 Although our
sample firms may also write business in life and health lines, a firm is designated as a
P&C insurer if they have reported to the NAIC as a P&C insurer. After limiting the
sample to groups and unaffiliated firms with positive premiums and ERM quality ratings,
the final sample includes 76 unique firms16 (66 groups and 10 unaffiliated; 51 publicly-
traded and 25 private firms) and a total of 467 firm-year observations. All publicly-traded
firms are insurance groups. The ERM-rated P&C firms in our sample account for 60.6
percent of direct premiums written during this period and 76.7 percent of direct premiums
written by publicly-traded firms. Stock price data are from the Center for Research in
Securities Prices (CRSP), and firm financial data are from the SNL Financial database
and COMPUSTAT.
13Note that, as a component of the ERM assessment, S&P measures a company’s ability to optimize
its risk profile by delivering less volatile operating performance. ROA is a better measure of operating
performance for companies with longer-tailed liabilities.
14See Liebenberg and Sommer (2008), Elango, Ma and Pope (2008), Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) for
detailed discussion related to these control variables.
15S&P assigns a group ERM score because the scope of their analysis is the whole enterprise. Group
members that are “core”, “highly strategic”, or “strategically important”, such that their processes are
integrated into the group ERM processes will all receive the same score. Other group members may
receive a stand-alone ERM score, but their ERM deficiencies are factored into the ERM score of the
group. (S&P, 2013a)
16A total of 212 insurance and reinsurance firms have received ERM quality ratings from S&P during the
sample period. There are 86 P&C firms with matches in the SNL database. After removing observations
with missing/negative net total assets and missing ROA, our final ERM sample includes 76 firms.
13
The initial sample of publicly-traded insurers includes 51 unique firms and 340 obser-
vations. The ratings and statutory data are based on these firms’ P&C insurance oper-
ations, whereas the Compustat Tobin’s Q measure is based on group-level consolidated
balance sheets that can include non-P&C operations. For insurers that have substan-
tial revenue from non-P&C sources, the use of an ERM rating that is tied to the P&C
insurance operations only would potentially result in a bias against finding a significant
ERM-value relation.17,18 To remove potential bias created by firms that have non-P&C
revenue sources, we also create a truncated sample of publicly-traded firms including only
those that have at least 70% of revenues from insurance premiums and at least 70% of
premiums in P&C business lines.19 This sample, which is used for the Tobin’s Q analysis,
consists of 28 firms and 159 observations.
The key variables of interest are measures of ERM quality and diversification. Busi-
ness line diversification (BLDIV) and geographic diversification (GEODIV) are calculated
using equations (1) and (2) over 24 lines of business and 57 geographies. As compared to
ERM implementation variables that have been used in most previous studies, the S&P
ERM-quality rating described above offers several advantages. First, it is clearly superior
to measures based on announcements such as appointment of a CRO or ERM adoption
which are noisy measures and do not allow differentiation based on the quality of ERM
processes. As discussed in the earlier sections, many benefits of ERM can only be achieved
with an overall high quality implementation. Measuring this degree of quality is the pri-
mary goal of the S&P ERM ratings. A simple indicator for ERM alone will not be able to
provide such information. Second, the S&P ERM quality rating provides a more precise
measurement of quality and does not require subjective judgment of the researcher or
an executive responding to a survey. The S&P ERM rating is given by an independent
third party, which makes it preferable to measures based on self-reported survey data.
Possible criticisms include the number of firms currently being rated, the number of years
of available data (2006-2013), the qualitative nature of many of the criteria from S&P’s
perspective, and the potential for manipulation or collusion with evaluators.20 Neverthe-
17In results not reported here, estimation of Tobin’s Q models for the full sample of publicly-traded
P&C insurers produced insignificant results for Tobin’s Q, arguably due to this bias.
18This is not an issue with the ROA sample because the ROA analysis only uses financial data for
ERM-rated firms that self-report as P&C insurers to the NAIC, while the Tobin’s Q measure is a proxy
for the value of the holding company based on consolidated financial data from all members of a group,
whether they are P&C insurers or not.
19We thank an anonymous reviewer for this valuable suggestion.
20Fair and accurate ratings arguably play an important role in the financial system. As with other types
of financial ratings, there can exist the potential for conflict of interest when agencies receive fees from
rated companies. For example, S&P receives compensation for its ratings and analytic services, normally
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less, it is our opinion that the S&P ERM quality rating is a better proxy for the quality
of ERM implementation and will be useful for many research purposes, particularly as
more years of rating data become available and the rated firms represent an increasing
share of the P&C industry.
In our analysis, the S&P ERM ratings are used to create dummy variables for ERM
Quality. Because relatively few firms receive Strong and Excellent/Very Strong ratings,
we collapse those groups into one category for analysis (ERM QUALITY=E/S). Similarly,
we collapse the Adequate sub-categories (after year 2010) into one (ERM QUALITY=A)
for consistency with data from the previous years. The reference category is the Weak
rating (ERM QUALITY=W).21
Figure 5 provides a graphical illustration of the relationship between the S&P ERM
rating and performance for the pooled sample of rated firms from 2006-2013. Consistent
with our expectation that better quality implementation of ERM in insurance company
organizations may be value-enhancing, we see a clearly monotonic relationship between
ERM rating and performance for both performance measures. Firms with an Excel-
lent/Strong ERM rating, on average, perform better than the firms with Weak ERM
ratings.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
While these univariate results suggest a positive relationship between effective ERM
strategy and performance, other factors, such as diversification and firm characteristics,
are expected to play a role. Explanations for the significant diversification discount found
in other studies often focus on the complexities inherent in large organizations, agency
costs, and internal capital market inefficiencies. These costs may be sufficiently large
to offset the advantages of scope economies and risk reduction.22 To better understand
from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors, and therefore could be subject to agency
problems. However, evidence suggests that reputational concerns discipline rating agency behavior.
Becker and Milbourn (2008, 2011) and Smith and Walter (2002) find evidence that in a competitive
environment for rating agencies, the provision of quality ratings is at least partially sustained by the
reputational concerns of the rating agencies.
21For the two stage least squares analysis, we use numerical scores for each rating category in the first
stage estimation. Some studies have attempted to more finely categorize by ERM quality. For example,
Baxter et al. (2013) create a rating of 1 to 6 from the original S&P ratings. With only three years of
ratings, this creates some small sample issues which are somewhat alleviated by the inclusion of a range
of financial services firms in their estimation. Further, there is no reason to believe that the value effect
from going from one category of Adequate to a better level of adequate is the same as that of going from
Weak to Adequate or Adequate to Strong.
22Although the finance literature has often identified the relatedness of business segments as a potential
problem for diversified firms, limiting our sample to the P&C industry removes much of that concern.
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the combined effects of ERM and diversification, we control for business line (BLDIV)
and geographic (GEODIV) diversification when examining the impact of ERM on insurer
performance.
Table 2 summarizes and defines all variables used in our analysis and Table 3 compares
the summary descriptive statistics by ERM-rating status, for U.S. P&C insurance compa-
nies in the SNL database over the period 2006 to 2013. The additional control variables
in our model include SIZE, measured as the log of admitted assets, CAPITALIZATION,
measured as policyholder surplus divided by admitted assets, whether the firm is a mem-
ber of a group (GROUP = 1), form of organization (STOCK = 1), the percent of total
premiums written in commercial lines (%COMMERCIAL), the percent of total assets
in stocks, mortgages, and real estate (%RISKYASSETS), and the percent of premiums
written in the life & health sector (%L/H).
[Insert Table 2 Here]
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Size has been shown to significantly affect performance, although studies have differed
on the sign. To the extent that there are diseconomies of scale and unmonitored agency
costs, we would expect to see reduced value for larger firms. However, larger insurers may
have lower insolvency risk, better market penetration, customer loyalty, reduced earnings
volatility, and efficiency of operations that may lead to positive value effects (Liebenberg
and Sommer, 2008). Our analysis is at the group level and includes unaffiliated insurers.
Groups may perform better relative to unaffiliated insurers because the ability to share
capital across group members should increase performance (Schlütter and Gründl, 2012).
But at the same time, internal capital markets may result in inefficient capital allocations
such as cross-subsidization of poorly performing segments. Therefore, the expected total
effect of GROUP is indeterminate. The expected effect of organizational form is ambigu-
ous. Mutuals may have higher costs for managerial monitoring, but stock companies are
exposed to owner-policyholder incentive conflicts. However, the benefits of access to cap-
ital markets by stock companies may offset the agency-related disadvantages of the stock
form of ownership. Well-capitalized firms are expected to have better performance. Firms
that invest more heavily in risky assets may perform better in the long run but also are
subject to higher risk. Firms in highly competitive commercial lines are expected to have
lower performance. Firms that write business in both the P&C and life-health sectors
are expected to underperform firms that focus only on one of the two sectors (Hoyt and
Trieschmann 1991).
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Additional variables used in the first stage of our two stage least squares (2SLS)
model, but excluded in the second stage, include AGE of the insurer, FS RATING, and
%REINSURANCE. Consistent with Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011), we define reinsurance
use as the ratio of reinsurance premium ceded to the sum of direct premium written
and reinsurance premium assumed.23 Summary statistics for these three variables are
also included in Table 3. We discuss the choice of these variables and their validity as
instrument variables in conjunction with the description of the 2SLS models in the next
section.
The results of paired t-tests indicate that the ERM-rated sample is significantly
younger, larger, and more diversified by both product line and geography. The ERM-
rated firms are much more likely to be in an insurance group and to be publicly-traded.
Although the ERM-rated firms are less capitalized and use less reinsurance, the average
financial strength rating is significantly higher. Interestingly, the univariate comparison
shows that the rated firms exhibit higher performance than unrated firms on average in
terms of the accounting-based ROA measure, although ROA is not a direct consideration
in selecting the firms to rate or deriving the ratings. The market-value based Tobin’s Q
measure is non-distinguishable between the two samples. Similar and oftentimes larger
differences in performance measures and firm characteristics are observed between the
sub-sample of publicly-rated ERM-rated insurers used for the Tobin’s Q analysis and the
ERM-unrated firms. Based on the differences between rated and unrated firms, conclu-
sions drawn from our analysis of the rated firms may not be generalizable to the whole
industry.
Empirical Results
The effect of ERM quality on P&C insurer performance is estimated using 2SLS to
account for potential endogeneity. Our hypothesis is that ERM quality has a positive effect
on performance, but it is possible that other variables jointly determine performance with
the ERM quality rating. We estimate a linear model in the first stage and include all of
the control variables from the second stage in order to ensure that the error term and the
estimated ERM rating are uncorrelated. In the first stage, we estimate the ERM quality
rating with a set of instruments that are expected to be associated with quality of the
23Theoretically reinsurance premium ceded (assumed) should equal to the sum of premium ceded to
(assumed from) affiliates and premium ceded to (assumed from) non-affiliates. However, since our analysis
is for insurance groups and non-affiliated insurers, premium ceded to (assumed from) affiliates should be
zero and we only consider premium ceded to (assumed from) non-affiliates in our calculation.
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ERM program. The dependent variable in the first stage is the ERM Quality Rating (= 1,
2, or 3), where a higher number corresponds to a better rating, i.e., Weak = 1, Adequate
= 2 and Strong/Excellent = 3. We include AGE as a proxy for organizational complexity.
Because complexity will add to the difficulties and costs in holistic risk management, we
expect more complex firms to have a lower ERM quality rating. As discussed previously,
we also expect that firms with better financial strength to have sufficient resources to
invest in high quality risk management programs (Baxter, et al., 2013) and therefore
expect a negative coefficient for the FS RATING variable (because a low rating indicates
better financial strength). Lastly, we include %REINSURANCE because of its importance
to an insurer’s ERM program. We expect that firms with greater usage of reinsurance
will have a better ERM quality rating. We also include control variables that are in
the second-stage regression: SIZE, CAPITALIZATION, GROUP, STOCK, GEODIV,
%COMMERCIAL, %RISKYASSETS, and %L/H. Note that the variables GROUP and
STOCK are not included in the Tobin’s Q regressions because all the firms included in
those regressions are members of insurance groups and are stock companies.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The results of the first stage estimation of ERM QUALITY are provided in Panel A
of Table 4.24 In both the ROA and Tobin’s Q regressions, AGE and GEODIV, as proxies
for organizational complexity, reduce the ERM rating, and the FS RATING variable
has a negative sign, indicating that high quality ERM is associated with greater financial
strength. %REINSURANCE does not have a significant impact on the ERM rating. Most
of the other control variables are not significant determinants of the ERM quality rating.25
The F-statistic from the first stage and the Hansen J test suggest that this combination of
instruments satisfy the relevance and exclusion restriction requirements. The estimated
ERM quality ratings from the first stage regression are then used as controls in the second
stage performance regressions.
The results of the second stage of the 2SLS regressions are reported in Panel B of
Table 4. The dependent variables are ROA and Tobin’s Q. For more direct comparability
with previous studies, we report the results for three versions of the model for each of
24The ERM sample contains 50 unique firms with both ERM and financial strength ratings for the
ROA regressions and 28 firms for Tobin’s Q regressions.
25The results reported for the first stage regression in Models (2) and (3), and those in Models (5)
and (6) are the same because these two models only differ in the second stage. They also include an
additional control variable BLDIV because this variable is included in the second stage regression for
these two models.
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the performance measures: including only the estimated ERM QUALITY rating from
the first stage (Models 1 and 4), adding the BLDIV variable (Models 2 and 5), and
adding the BLDIV × ERM QUALITY interaction term (Models 3 and 6). To account
for the panel structure of our sample, we estimate the models with year fixed effects and
adjust the standard errors for firm-level clustering (Petersen 2009; Thompson 2011).26 We
include control variables for firm characteristics that have been used in previous studies of
insurance company performance (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Liebenberg and Sommer,
2008; Elango, Ma, and Pope, 2008),27 including SIZE, CAPITALIZATION, GEODIV,
GROUP, STOCK, % COMMERCIAL, % RISKYASSETS, and %L/H. Again, note that
the variables GROUP and STOCK are not relevant for the Tobin’s Q regressions.
The results of the 2SLS analysis show that ERM QUALITY has a positive and signif-
icant effect on both ROA and Tobin’s Q in all of the second stage regressions. Note that,
by limiting the Tobin’s Q sample to publicly-traded firms that derive at least 70 percent of
revenue from insurance premiums and at least 70 percent of premium revenue from P&C
lines, the sample size is much smaller than that used in the ROA analysis. Although the
results are largely consistent with the ROA results, they may not be broadly applicable
to a larger cross-section of publicly-traded insurers.
More interestingly, we find that diversification also has a significant and positive effect
on ROA when ERM quality is taken into account and is an insignificant factor for Tobin’s
Q. This suggests that with a high quality ERM program, diversification can be a viable
performance-enhancing strategy for insurers rather than a negative factor as has been
shown to be true, on average, for P&C insurers. Most of the control variables have the
expected effect on performance or are insignificant. In general, we find that firms that are
better capitalized and those affiliated with a group have higher ROA. Stock firms do not
perform as well as mutuals, and firms in highly competitive commercial lines also have
lower performance. Firms that have a significant portion of their business in the life and
health sector also tend to perform better.
Our results show that the combined effects of a high quality ERM program and a
26The results of a Hausman test suggest that fixed effects is a better specification than random effects.
Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) argue that year fixed effects were not advised with their sample because
the key explanatory variable, a dummy for multiline firms, did not exhibit sufficient variation over time.
The diversification measures used in this study exhibit much greater time variation. Because of the
potential overlap between the ERM quality variable and the firm fixed effects, any ERM-specific effects
may be masked by the firm fixed effects. This is an empirical problem similar to one encountered in the
credit rating literature. We follow the literature (Kuang and Qin 2013) and do not include firm fixed
effects but adjust the standard errors for firm-level clustering.
27Note that we can only include a limited set of control variables because of the small sample size. We
have selected the ones that are shown to be most important in the previous literature.
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diversification strategy are positive on firm performance, as measured by ROA or Tobin’s
Q. These results are largely consistent with ERM studies using an ERM implementation
indicator (e.g., Hoyt and Liebenberg 2011) as previously discussed. This is also consistent
with earlier studies that have considered the effect of ERM quality ratings for shorter
sample periods, such as Baxter et al. (2013), who find the ERM quality rating to have
a positive effect on ROA and Tobin’s Q for the period 2006-2008, McShane, Nair, and
Rustambeokov (2011) who find a positive relationship between ERM rating and Tobin’s
Q for 2008, and Pooser (2012) for the period 2009-2010 (ROA only). However, our results
are inconsistent with Lin, Wen, and Yu (2012), who find ERM to result in a discount to
firms’ performance measured by ROA or Tobin’s Q in their single year study.
To further investigate the joint performance effects of diversification and ERM, we also
run a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression where ERM quality is measured using
categorical dummy variables for Adequate (ERM QUALITY = A) and Excellent/Strong
(ERM QUALITY = E/S). The omitted category is Weak. This categorical specification
allows us to investigate the economic significance of our results and also allows more di-
rect comparison to results of the previous literature on the diversification-performance
relationship. Again, the OLS regression is for the sample of P&C groups and unaffiliated
firms with non-negative premiums and assets and S&P ERM quality ratings for the years
2006-2013. The ROA estimation includes the full sample, and the Tobin’s Q estimations
include the publicly-traded firms that derive at least 70% of revenues from insurance pre-
miums and at least 70% of premiums from P&C business. As a first step, we examine the
diversification-performance relationship for our sample without the ERM control variable.
These results are reported as Models 1 and 5 in Table 5. Firm and year fixed effects are
controlled for and the robust standard errors are adjusted for firm- and year-level clus-
tering. Consistent with the prior literature, we find a highly significant diversification
discount to firm’s performance, when measured by ROA (Model 1). However, we do not
find a significant diversification discount for Tobin’s Q (Model 5). This is likely due to
the smaller degree of variation in diversification in the sample of publicly-traded insurers
and the much smaller sample size.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
We next examine our main hypotheses by including both ERM QUALITY and diver-
sification (BLDIV) as independent variables, controlling for various firm characteristics,
and for year fixed effects. For each of the measures of performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q),
we first estimate a model controlling only for ERM QUALITY and firm characteristics
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(Models 2 and 6). In Models 3 and 7 we include the ERM QUALITY dummies and
diversification (BLDIV), and in Models 4 and 8, we add an interaction term BLDIV ×
ERM QUALITY.28
Consistent with the 2SLS results, the OLS results show that ERM quality has a strong
positive impact on both ROA and Tobin’s Q. As compared to firms that receive “Weak”
ERM quality ratings, firms rated as “Excellent/Strong” and “Adequate” both have sig-
nificantly higher performance. When both ERM quality and business line diversification
are included in the ROA models, the ERM coefficient is lower but still positive and sig-
nificant. In contrast to previous studies that suggest a negative performance effect for
business line diversification, we find that business line diversification has a strong positive
effect on ROA. As previously reported in this paper, P&C insurers have been steadily
reducing their product line diversification over the last decade. This may, in fact, be
the observed results of joint consideration of the diversification strategy and ERM im-
plementation, thus lessening the previously documented diversification discount effects.
After controlling for the interactions between the ERM ratings and BLDIV, we find that
the combined marginal effects of both diversification and ERM quality on ROA are still
positive. The results for Tobin’s Q are largely consistent with the ROA results discussed
above. Again, these results can be subject to the sample limitations discussed previously.
Our results also reveal the nuanced relationship between the ERM quality, product line
diversification, and firm performance. With everything else equal, the combined marginal
effect of ERM quality and diversification on ROA for a less diversified firm (BLDIV
= 0.2) and Adequate ERM quality is 4.908% whereas the effect for a similar but more
diversified firm (BLDIV = 0.8) with Adequate ERM is 7.084%.29 In comparison, for firms
with Excellent/Strong ERM quality, the estimated effect on ROA is 7.205% for the less
diversified firm and 6.232% for more diversified firms.30Although the combined effect of
ERM quality and diversification is positive for all four hypothetical firms, the economic
28For robustness, we have also run the 2SLS and OLS regressions using either the risk-adjusted ROA
as the dependent variable, defined as ROA divided by the rolling 3-year standard deviation of ROA, or
adding the 3-year standard deviations of ROA as a control for risk. The results are largely the same as
our main results presented in the paper.
29Compared to the reference category of firms with Weak ERM, the combined marginal effect of ERM
QUALITY and BLDIV on ROA can be estimated as [4.183 × (ERM QUALITY=A)] + [7.529 × (ERM
QUALITY=E/S)] + [8.077 × BLDIV] – [4.451 × BLDIV × (ERM QUALITY=A)] – [9.698 × BLDIV×
(ERM QUALITY=E/S)]. Thus, the effect for the less diversified hypothetical firm with Adequate ERM
quality is calculated as 4.183 + (8.077× 0.2)–(4.451× 0.2) = 4.908 and the effect for the more diversified
hypothetical firm is calculated as 4.183 + (8.077× 0.8)–(4.451× 0.8) = 7.084.
30The effect on the Excellent/Strong ERM quality and less diversified firm’s ROA is 7.529 + (8.077×
0.2)–(9.698×0.2) = 7.205 and the effect for the more diversified firm is 7.529+(8.077×0.8)–(9.698×0.8) =
6.232.
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benefit of having an Excellent/Strong ERM program is greater for the less diversified
firms.31 This may reflect the additional cost of implementing excellent ERM in the more
complex system of a diversified firm.32
Summary and Conclusions
This study uses a sample of P&C insurers with S&P ERM quality ratings from 2006
to 2013 to investigate the independent and combined effects of ERM and diversification
on P&C insurer performance. In contrast to previous studies that document significant
product line and geographic diversification discounts relative to more focused competitors,
we find that the combined effect of product line diversification and ERM quality on both
ROA and Tobin’s Q is positive relative to those with weak-rated ERM programs. For
the firms in our sample, geographic diversification is not a significant factor determining
ROA, but may have a negative effect on Tobin’s Q.
With increasing regulatory pressure to adopt and implement enterprise-wide risk man-
agement programs, this research is both timely and important for large financial insti-
tutions. Better understanding of the impact of ERM will inform the development of
rating criteria, reporting requirements, and managerial decision-making. Although most
insurance companies have begun to implement ERM at some level, their ERM programs
are multi-faceted and differ widely from firm to firm. Assessment of the value of such
programs requires more detailed understanding of the components. Our study adds to
the growing body of research on the value of ERM by providing a unique perspective to
assess potential ERM outcomes for firms with different diversification strategies.
There are four acknowledged limitations to this study. First, our sample is limited
to P&C insurers that have received an ERM quality rating from the S&P. These firms,
on average, are more likely to be large, publicly-traded group insurers. Therefore, the
results and insights are not necessarily generalizable to the entire industry. Limiting the
analysis to P&C insurers is an intentional choice to avoid previously-documented issues
related to industry-specific differences. However, because the sample represents more than
31Similar quantitative effects are found for Tobin’s Q but should be interpreted with caution due to
the stronger sample limitations.
32As a robustness check, we also investigate whether the ERM-diversification-performance relationship
was affected by the financial crisis. By adding a financial crisis dummy (and omitting the year fixed effects)
in our regressions, we find that our main results are not substantially different and firm performance is
significantly worse during the financial crisis period. To conserve space, we do not report these results in
the paper but they are available upon request from the authors.
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60% of all P&C insurers based on direct premium written, these results are economically
significant. Second, the Tobin’s Q results are based on an even smaller subset of firms and
are therefore only applicable to large publicly-traded P&C insurance groups which derive
most revenue from P&C business. Third, we implicitly assume that the S&P ERM quality
rating is a proxy for the true quality of a firm’s ERM program. Because the ERM quality
rating is a component of a broader assessment of credit rating and capital adequacy, it
is possible that the analysts more narrowly focus on aspects of ERM that are relevant to
credit risk. Documentation available from S&P suggests that their assessment covers a
wide range of risk management issues, but closer examination of the ERM rating criteria
and the relationship between the ERM rating and the financial strength ratings may be
an avenue for future research. Lastly, while the Hausman test of exogeneity suggests
only minor endogeneity of diversification concern in our sample, it could potentially be
a bigger concern if future research enlarges the sample to include other insurers such as
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Figure 1. Business Line and Geographic Diversification, 2001-2013
Note: This figure shows the trends in average BLDIV and GEODIV from 2001 to 2013. BLDIV mea-
sures an insurer’s business line diversification and is the complement of the Herndahl-Hirschman Index
calculated using direct premiums written across all business lines. GEODIV measures geographic di-
versification and is the complement of the Herndahl-Hirshman Index calculated using direct premiums
written over all states.
35
Figure 2. Business Line Diversification by Tercile of Firm Size, 2001-2013
Note: This figure shows the trend in average BLDIV for each tercile of firm size from 2001-2013. BLDIV
measures an insurer’s business line diversification and is the complement of the Herndahl-Hirschman
Index calculated using direct premiums written across all business lines.
36
Figure 3. Geographic Diversification by Tercile of Firm Size, 2001-2013
Note: This figure shows the trend in average GEODIV for each tercile of firm size from 2001-2013.
GEODIV measures geographic diversification and is the complement of the Herndahl-Hirschman Index
calculated using direct premiums written over all states.
37
Figure 4. Distribution of S&P ERM Quality Ratings for all Rated P&C Insurance Firms
Source: Standard and Poor’s, 2013c.
38
Figure 5. Performance by ERM Quality Rating, Sample of Firms with S&P ERM Quality
Ratings, 2006-2013
Note: Panel A illustrates the relationship between Average ROA and ERM Quality Rating for rated
firms in the pooled cross-sectional time series. The average ROA is -2.875% for ERM Quality Rat-
ing=Weak (W), 2.741% for ERM Quality Rating=Adequate (A) and 2.947% for ERM Quality Rat-
ing=Excellent/Strong (E/S). Panel B illustrates the relationship between Average Tobin’s Q and ERM
Quality Rating in our sample. The average Tobin’s Q is 1.001 for ERM Quality Rating=Weak (W), 1.050
for ERM Quality Rating=Adequate (A), and 1.125 for ERM Quality Rating=Excellent/Strong (E/S).
39
